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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Tn the :.ratter of the Estate of 
ROBERT L. PROUDFIT, 
Deceased 
ST~-\TE~IEXT OF FAC'rS 
Respondent agrees "·it h Appellant's sta tern en t of 
facts. Ho\Ye,~er, \Ye are constrained to add that it is 
not disputed that if any of the sPrYiee~ to tenants which 
g·iye rise to the charges in controversy had been dis-
continued the tenants would ha,~e brought snit immedi-
ately for treble damages under the Federal Price Control 
Act. Such suits would obviously waste the assets and 
property of the estate. All of the disputed expenditures 
were made prior to the filing of the inheritance tax 
return, and while the property was subject to Federal 
Rent Control Regulations. (R. 58 and 37) 
Only actual expenses were claimed by the Re·spond-
ent Executrix as deductions. Expenditures for capital 
improvements, such as installation of a sprinkling sys-
tem, were exclndecl by her from the deductions claimed 
(R. il3). 
All of the items claimed are the reasonable value 
of the sen·iees and facilities ohtaine<l h)· Respondent 
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Executrix, and all of them were necessary to preserve 
the estate property -(R. 53). The testirqony in this 
regard was not disputed. 
STATEiMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
RHspondent relies on the following points: 
1. Each of the deductions allowed by the trial Court 
and listed in Appellant's Statement of Errors was 
properly allowed as costs or as expenses of adminis-
tration under Section 80-12-8 U.C.A., 1943, as amended. 
2. If not so allowable, each such deduction \Yas 
properly allowed under said ~section as a debt owing by 
decedent at the time of his death. 
3. It is immaterial whether the expenses questioned 
were paid out of rental income or out of the corpus of 
the estate. (Appellant's brief, Question (3), page 10.) 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The deductions allowed are proper as "costs" 
or "expenses" of adrninistratio11. 
(a) At the outset we wish to call attention to one 
aspect of this point which, it is believed, should deter-
mine this appeal in favor of Respondent. 
Appellant concedes on page 11 of its brief that ''an 
expense incurred in the preservation of decedent's estate 
is a cost of administration" and ~s properly deductable. 
This is of course the reasonable and general rule. The 
testimony of Respondent's manager that all the claimed 
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deductions were necessary to preserve the estate was not 
disputed or impeached and must be taken as true. (Its 
verity will become quite apparent as the nature of each 
item is considered hereafter.) It follows from this alone 
that the trial court's order allo,vin,g· the decluctions 
should be affirmed. 
(b) But there are additional grounds for affirming 
the order appealed from. 
The statute, Section 80-12-8, U.C.A., does not define 
the term ''Costs of Administration'' nor the term ''Ex-
penses of Administration." Nor has the Tax Commis-
sion promulgated any official regulation defining these 
phrases. However, the Probate Coile prescribes the 
mandatory duties of the Executrix in administering an 
~state, and directs that she be allo,vecl her expenses in-
curred therein. From a consideration of the rlutie.c; of 
admi'YI!istration there arises hy necessary inference an 
inclusive definition of the expenses of administration. 
Anything necessarily or reasonahl~, expended in the dis-
charge of a duty of administration is neces~sarily an 
expense of administration. 
What, then, are the duties of administration? 
Section 102-11-3, U.C.A., 1943, provides: 
''The executor ... is entitled to, and rnust 
take po,ssession of, all the real and personal estate 
of the decedent, and shall receive the rents and 
prof-i,ts of the real estate until the estate is set-
tled or delivered over hy order of the Court to 
the heirs or devisees; and must keep i11 ,r;ood 
lf'naJilalJle repair all lumsf's, buildiJI.r;s aild fix-
:~ 
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tures. thereon which are under his control 
(Italics added.) 
And Section 102-11-24, U.C.A. 1943, provides: 
" 
"He (the executor) shall be allowed all neces-
sary expenses in the care, management and set-
tlement of the estate, including reasonable fees 
paid to attorneys for conducting the necessary 
... suits in court ... " 
These sections were on our statute books as early 
as 1898, and had long been in effect when the legislature, 
in 1943, amended Section 80-12-8, U.C.A. 1943, to pro-
vide for the first time an inheritance tax deduction for 
''costs and expenses of administration,'' instead of 
merely for ''Court costs'' as had been provided until 
that recent date. See Session Laws of Utah, 1943, Chap. 
88, Section 1. 
Obviously, where out tax statute, ·without defining 
specially the terms it uses, refers to the '' administra-
tion" of estates and the "expenses" thereof, the long 
standing statutes defining the duties of administration 
and providing what expenses are allowable to the ad-
ministrator, are in paria materia., and must be construed 
together. Generally statutes are not to be considered 
as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts 
of a great, connected, homogeneous system. 
50 Am. Jur., p. 345, et seq. 
It seems clear then, that the intention of the 1943 
legislature was to allow as deductions all the expenses 
incident to the collection of rents from real estate, the 
expense of keeping all houses, buildings, and fixtures 
.--
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thereon in good and tenantable repair, and the expenses 
of the care and management of the c>1·:date, as these arP 
all official duties required of him. Any other con-
struction would not only violate the rule of construction 
referred to, it would also largely abrogate the effect 
of the 1943 amendment to the tax statute, and it should 
not be assumed that the legislature chang·ed and broad-
ened the words without intending- to change and broaden 
the meaning. 
This court has had occasion to construe the two 
quoted sections of the Probate Code in the case of 
In re Hansen's Estate, 55 
rtah 23, 184 Pac. 197. 
The Court held that under the provisions of those sec-
tions the expenses of making repairs to existing build-
ings, su.ch as putting in nPw floors, or putting on a new 
roof, or repairing existing fences, is a. proper expense 
of administration. The Court further held that the 
provision for allowance of necessary expenses in the 
care and management of the estate is even broad enoug·h 
to include such permanent improvements on the land 
as are necessary for its occupancy and to preserve the 
estate. 
That case really goes even farther than is here 
necessary to a decision affirming the order appealed 
from. 
For here we have expense: 
1. For garden labor to maintain and preserve lawn, 
shrubs, trees and flowers with which the real estate 
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was improved. The Court, we submit, will take judicial 
notice that in this climate land once cultivated, when 
neglected and without irrigation or cultivation, rapidly 
loses its value. It will even become a public nuisance, 
overgrown with noxious weeds, subjecting the person 
responsible to civil and criminal liability. 
2. For labor and management service-obviously 
necessary on so large a property to preserve the estate 
and to discharge thE> executrix' duty to collect the rents 
for the account of the estate. 
3. For repairs to the heating system. This item is 
within the exact letter of the statute and of the Hansen 
case. Moreover, a complex mechanism, once out of 
order, inevitably and rapidly deteriorates further unless 
repaired immediately. 
4. For heating the buildings. It is to be remarked 
that all houses were heated by a central system, so that 
the individual tenants could not themselves heat their 
apartments. And we think the ( \mrt will take judicial 
notice that no unheated house in Ogden was "tenaut-
able'' in the ''Great Winter'' of 194-8-49. Furthermore, 
without at least minimum heating the pipes would 
freeze and burst and the estate would suffer waste and 
material deterioration. Finally, the executrix t~ok on'r 
this property at the death of the testator subjec-t to the 
rights of the tenants therein. One of their rights, guar-
anteed by the Federal Price Control Act and the Rent 
regulations, was to have the premises heated. The 
executrix had no right to discontinue this service. If 
she had attempted so to do she '''ould have been com-
() 
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pelled by administrative and ( \mrt order to resumP, 
and would have been subject to expensivP legal action 
for trebled damages, which would han• wasted and 
depleted the estate. (Of this, more later.) Nor could 
she have performed her dnt~· to collect rents while 
breaching the estate's duty to heat the buildings. She 
expended only what she was rompellerl to expend to 
preserve the estate and to perform her statutory dn1 ~·. 
How then can it be said that this expenditure ''ras not 
an ·~expense of administration''? 
3. For '·general repairs'' necessary to maintain and 
preserve the estate. This included repairs of broken 
windows, blinds, plumbing and the replacement of a 
floor which had been ruined. All are within the letiPr 
of the statute and the Hansen case. All \n•rc mandator~· 
duties of the executrix. 
6. For (a) electric power furnished for street or 
court lighting and for operation of the stoves and re-
frigerators, and (b) repairs to stoves and refrigerators. 
The furnishing of power 'Yas n1andatory under the Rent 
Control regulations, as was the heating previou·sly dis-
cussed. Outside lighting is also a reasonable safety 
precaution to protect against mischief and hence is an 
expense of administration. Repair of fixtures has al-
ready been discussed. It also was required hy rent cml-
trol. 
7 .. For water (a) used to irrigate and preserve the 
real estate (previously discussed) and (b) supplied to 
tenants (as required by rent control and testator's lease) 
for domestic and culinary purposes. Surel~· at least 
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some of this domestic water was used to clean and 
preserve the improvements. 
8. For insurance premiums on estate improvements. 
Surely here is an expense reasonably undertaken purely 
for the preservation of the estate. 
It is respectfully submitted that all items fall within 
the letter and the purpose and intent of the tax statute 
authorizing deduction for "costs and expenses of ad-
ministrration'' as properly constructed in the light of 
the Probate Code provisions outlining- the duties of ad-
ministration. 
(c) There is further guidance to be gained from 
In re Hansen's Estate, 33 l'tah 
23, 184- Pac. 197, 204, 
where this Court, in considering what are expenses of 
administration, stated 
''It is impossible to lay down any hard and 
fast rule to govern in matters of this kind. Much 
must necessarily be left to the judgment and 
sound discretion of the trial judge ... '' 
In this ease the trial judge has properly exercised 
his judgment and sound discretion to allow the deduct-
ions in question as expenses of administration, all as 
reported and returned to the Court. This ( 1ourt, in this 
case should not interfere with the trial judge's exercise 
of his discretion, in the absence of a showing of mani-
fest abuse thereof. Certain]~· no such showing· has been 
or can be made here. 
.. 
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(d) Appell~nt in its brief contends that this Court 
should reverse the trial Court and upset its exercise 
of discretion because the Appellant's ag-ents have for 
four years followed a practice of disallowing such de-
ductions. Appellant·~ contention i~ unsound for several 
reason~. 
First, Appellant is merely a collector of the inheri-
tance tax, and in respect thereto does not exercise the 
quasi-judicial administratiYP function resulting· in rul-
ings and decisions which give rise to a persuasive or 
recognized admini~tratiYe cm1~truction. In the case of 
inheritance tax the District Court (in Probate) alone 
has jurisdiction to make such rulings. Section 80-12-35, 
r.r.A. 1943. This has been recog11ized by the Appellant 
collector in practice since the inception of the inheritance 
tax, for it has neyer made any order fixing or determin-
ing deductions, or the tax itself, as to an estate in pro-
hate, but all such questions have been uniformly re-
ferred to the Court. It is also interesting to note that 
the Appellant Commission has llPYer attempted to pro-
mulgate a regulation on the subject. The case is quite 
otherwise, of coursr, with the sales and income tax. 
And, so far as we are advised, the specific question at 
bar has never been submitted to a District Court for a 
ruling since the statute allowing deductior) of adminis-
trath·e expense was enacted in 19-t-3. 
We doubt that this point was callt><l to the Court's 
attention when it was considered In re Cowan's Esta t0, 
98 Utah 292, 99 Pac. 2d 605, cited h~· Appellant here. 
~f oreover, in that cas<' the Dist rid Courts had for morP 
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than 20 years ruled on the issue there involved. The 
case cited is not in point. 
Second, the practice of the Appellant Commission 
i1i this regard is contrary to the ciear meaning of the 
law, and hence the doctrine is inappliooble. See 
Utah Concrete Products Company vs. 
State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 
125 Pac. 2d 408 . 
. cited in Appellant's ·brief. 
Third, the facts stipulated do not show an adminis-
trative interpretation within the rule. In the case of 
E. C. Olsen Company vs. State Tax 
Commission 168 Pac. 2d 324, 332. 
cited by Appellant, the Court says: 
''The facts of this case do not show a prac-
tical interpretation of the statute by the Tax 
Commission. No regulations were passed specifi-
cally covering the questioned s~ales. Neither is 
it shown that the Commission acted in close 
harmony with the legislature in respect to legis-
lation or proposals or as an advisory body to the 
Legislature in reference to these or similar arti-
cles during the time they were not taxed with 
knowledge that they were not taxed. . . Oral 
statements of Tax Commission auditors do not 
amount to administrative construction by the 
Commission.'' 
There is no administrative construction of the 
statute here in question to which the Court can gin• 
consideration, serious or otherwise. 
10 
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(e) Absent its own regulation the Appellant Com-
mission seeks comfort in Regulation 1 0;), Sections 81-:-t~ 
and 81 <~3. promulgated by the Federal Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue, the Appellant stating that the Utah Tax 
Commission is guided, whenever possible, b~· Federal 
Regulations. 
\Ye submit that these are entirely irrelevant. In 
the first place the Federal statute on the subject pro-
vides for the deduction of such administrative expenses 
''as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction . . . 
under which the estate is being administered,'' so that 
properly the Bureau of Internal Revenue mnst look to 
our Probate Code and our Courts, rather than vieP-
versa. See U.S. Internal Revenue Code, section 812 (b). 
In the second place the Federal Courts themselves 
have allowed deductions for analagous expenditures as 
expense of administration in cases \\'hieh in many re-
spects are not so strong as the one no·w before this 
( iourt. See 
and 
Adams vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
110 Fed. 2d 578, 
Estate of Fannie R. Brewer, I )n<'kPt No. 99711, 
B.T.A., December 26, 1941; 10 Prentice-Hall B. 
T.A. Mem. Dec., paragraph 41, :>7-1-. 
Appellant contends that the expenses claimed as 
deductions here were unnecessary and wen· not made iu 
good faith for the benefit and preservatio11 of the PstatP, 
hnt were incurred primarily in the production -of rental 
income for the benefit of the devisee. If true, this con-
11 
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tention might render less applicable the Adams and 
Brewer Estate cases cited above. But it is not true. 
The manager's testimony, which was not attacked, and 
which the trial Court believed and found to be true, 
was that all these expenses were necessarily incurred 
to preserve the estate (R. 53), and that under Govern-
ment fixed rentals the operation was not a money paying 
proposition (R. 57). 
And, as has been shown, every deduction claimed 
(which did not include all of the expenditures in oon-
nection with the operation) was either in performance, 
or a necessary prerequisite to performance of one or 
another duty enjoined by law upon the Executrix, and 
which was required to be performed in the course of 
administration. Had she failed or refused to perform, 
the estate would not have been preserved; it would in-
evitably have been wasted and depleted in several 
obvious ways. How can it be said that in making ex-
penditures forced upon her by law she was acting pri-
marily for the profit of the devisee, even though in this 
case it so happens that she is also the devisee~ The 
devisee and the executrix are separate legal entities, 
and in any other case they would be likely to be differ-
ent persons. 
Under these circumstances the fact that part of 
the expenses were a necessary incident to the collection 
of rent accruing after the date of testator's death is 
immaterial. The property was rented at and before that 
date. Under Rent Control regulations she could neither 
terminate the tenancy nor refuse the established services 
previously rendered to the tenants. 
]:3 
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(f) And as a matter of faet the collection of the rents 
was necessary in order to raise moiH'Y to pay debts, 
taxes, and expenses of administration. A glance at tlw 
inventories (R. 1-l- and 19) discloses that there was less 
than $5000 cash in the estate and that the only liquid 
asset was First Sernrit~· Corporation stock worth 
$~5~5.00. On the other hand expenses and obligations, 
including Federal and State Inheritance Taxes, obvi-
ously total substantially more than $25,000.00 The fair 
inference is the fact: the executrix' prime motive is, 
first, to preserve the estate intrusted to her, and second, 
to find some way to raise the money necessary to pay 
the expenses, debts and obligations. A.ny realizable 
profit, as sug·gested h~· Appellant, was just out of the 
question. 
The rent, of course, like the property of the estate, 
was subject to proper disposition by the executrix in the 
course of administration and the discharge of the obli-
gations of the estate. This is made aboundantly clear 
by the provisions of section 102-12-4, U.C.A. 1943, pro-
viding that· real estate is to be distributed only when 
it does not appear that the rents, issues and profits 
thereof are necessary to be received by the executor 
to pay the debts ''of the estate.'' Note that the term 
used is broader than the "debts of decedent." 
All such obligations of the estate are of course 
charges upon the corpus out of which the rent springs, 
and estate taxes, both state and federal, are liens thereon 
which it is the executor's duty to discharge by appli-
cation of any funds legally available therefore. 
1') 
" 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The common law rule is abrogated by the statutes 
hereinbefore referred to, and the rents were properly 
applied to administrative purposes. The devisee had 
and has no right to object. 
See also 
In re Roessler's Estate, 
160 Atl. 370 (N.J. Eq.), 
Loscalzo vs. Eggner, 
78 Atl. 607 (Del.), and 
In re Bradfield's Estate, 
221 Pac. 531 (Mont.) 
It is respectfully submitted that the expenses neces-
sary to collect the rents for payment of debts, taxes and 
necessary to perform the obligations assumed by testator 
as a landlord and which were prerequisite to rent col-
lection, are ''expenses'' of administration and properl)T 
deducta ble. 
Point 2. Said deductions are also allowable as deduct-
ions for debts ''owing by decedent at the time 
of his death" under Section 80-12-8, P.C . .-1. 
1943. 
With the possible exception of the items for "man-
agement services" and insurance premiums (items 2 and 
9 of Appellant's brief, p. 9-), which are clearly deduc· 
table as administrative expense, all of the deductions 
are also proper as debts of the decedent. 
It is not disputed that the testator in his lifetime 
rented all of the housing units in question to the tenants 
\vho occupied them after his death and during the 
period in question. Nor is it disputed that he, in hi~ 
14 
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leasing arrangements with them contracted and agreed 
to furnish the serYices involved, and that the premises 
and the agreements for servire were subject to O.P.A. 
rent regulations. 
It is elementary that the executrix and the devisee 
take possession and title to the testator's land subject 
to all of the outstanding estates, charges, and covenants 
made or created by the testator during his lifetime. 
They get no better title than the testator. The testator 
of course could not collect the rents unless he performed 
the covenants which were part of the consideration 
therefor. Neither could the executrix collect the rents 
in performance of her statutory duty without perform 
ing testator's obligations and covenants which he had 
contracted in his lifetime. 
The3e obligations were clearly "owing" by the 
decedent at the time of his death" \Yithin the meaning 
of the controlling statute, even though they ·were con-
tinuously performable during the term of the leases of 
which they were a part. They were "owing at the time 
of his death" quite as much as testator's promissory 
note payable in monthly installments would be. They 
were "owing" even though not all "due" at the date 
of death. This construction is clearly within the letter 
as well as the purpose and intent of the statute. 
Nor did the executrix have any power or ri:!;·ht to 
cancel that portion of the obligation not yet due or per-
formable. Under Rent Control Regulations the change 
of ownership was no excuse for termination of the ten-
mw~· and the obligation or covenant for services in effect 
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"ran with the land" even more effectively than an old 
common law covenant or easement could, for highly 
penal statutes and regulations, as well as the equitable 
remedy of injunction, ·were available to compel per-
formance. 
See, in this connection, the Emergency Price ( \m-
trol Act of 1942, as amended, especially Title 50 r.s. 
C.A. App., Section 925, as amended by Act of July 30, 
1947, Ch. 361, Title I, Section 101, 61 State. 619, and the 
Controlled Housing and Rent Regulation Section 825.1 
as amended July 1, 1948, Section 3, relating to minimum 
services. See also Housing and Rent Act of 1947, Sec-
tion 209, as amended effective April 1, 1948 (Published 
with the Rent Regulation last referred to), relating· to 
evictions. 
See also Controlled Housing Rent Regulation Sec-
tion 825.6 as amended April 5, 1949, relating to evictious. 
It is clear that under the circumstances existing, 
the refusal of the executrix to honor the continuing obli-
gations of the testator to the tenants would have resulted 
in actions for trebled damages with concomitant ex-
pense, which would certainly have depleted the estate. 
Hence it follows, as has been pointed out heretofore, 
that the expense of honoring those obligations to avoid 
such depletion is an expense of administration. 
It is also clear that such obligations constitute debts 
of the estate which must be discharged. The fact that 
no claims were filed, or that they were not approved 
b~T the Court prior to payment is immaterial. No claims 
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are required on debts or obligations where performance 
is not due until after death. 
It is generally the duty of the executor to perform 
decedent's executory contracts not terminated by death, 
such, for example, as a building· contract. 
2 Bancroft's Probate Practice 
Section 528, pp. 967, et seq. 
If there is no default in a land contract until after 
death, it is not necessary to present a claim. 
Burdick vs. Kerkovecz, 254 
Pac. 684 (Cal.) 
And the right to exercise an option to purchase corporate 
stock owned by decedent is not barred by failure to 
present a claim . 
. Johnson vs. J ohnsou, 
286 Pac. 109 (Colo.) 
The obligation of a deceased lessee to place the demised 
premises in the same condition at the end of the term 
is not a "claim" against the estate, but it is a liability 
of the executor, where the breach did not occur until 
after death. 
~athan vs. Freeman, 225 
Pac. 1015 (-:\[out.) 
Moreover it is proper to allow credit to the personal 
representative for money expended in payment of liens, 
the discharge of which is necessary to the preservation 
or the estate. See 
3 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 
Section 964. 
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See also 
3 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 
Section 785. 
It is obvious that the performance of all such obli-
gations in effect depletes the value of the estate re-
ceived by the heir or devisee, whether the same must be 
paid out of the corpus of the estate or out of the rents 
to accrue during administration. In the latter case the 
value of the corpus is definitely and adversely affected 
by and to the extent of the claims and obligations which 
are a charge thereon, and on the rents springing there-
from. It would seem therefore that on reason as well 
as under the law these obligations, which can in fact 
only be ascertained in the conrse of administration, an' 
just as valid as deductions as are debts which must be 
filed as claims under the non-claim statute. 
It is therefore respectfull.v submitted that the de-
ductions in question, even if not properly allowed as 
expenses of administration, were properl~, allowed as 
debts due at the time of decedent's death. 
Point 3. It is immaterial w-hether thP expenses quest-
ioned were paid ont of rPJdal inrome 01· out 
of the corpus of the estate. 
Under Question 2 of Appellant's brief, Appellant 
gives considerable consideration to the question of 
whether the expenses claimed should be taken out of 
rental income produced by reason of such expenditurf•s. 
See Appellant's brief, pages 18 to 27 inclusive. As we 
view it, this is entirely immaterial. Under the statutes 
of Utah the rentals are subject to the payment of all 
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proper expenses of administration and debts of the 
estate, as has been shown. The tax statute allowing 
the deductions does not place any limitations on the 
allowance by reason of the source of the money used to 
pay the obligations allowed. Let us suppose, for the 
sake of argument, an estate in which there were no 
money to pay expenses of administration, including 
court costs and attorneys' fees, and the devisee of the 
real estate, in order to prevent the sale thereof for the 
purpose of paying these expenses contributed to the 
executor in cash the amount necessary to pay the Same. 
The money so used would be even more obviously the 
private property of the devisee than it is in this case, 
and yet we apprehend it could not seriously he said that 
these court costs and attorneys' fees so paid would not 
be a proper deduction for inheritance tax purposes. 
At the argument before the trial Court, the Appel-
lant here argued strenuously that the allowance of these 
deductions, when there was rental income from which 
they might be paid, was contrary to the· general scheme 
or philosophy of the Inheritance Tax· Law of Utah. But 
tax laws rarely follow with legal nicety the close reason-
ing and logic which are characteristic of the develop-
ment of the common law through judicial decision. De-
ductions and exemptions are frequently allowed by the 
legislature, either as a matter of policy or as a matter 
of grace, whether or not it is strictly logical so to do and 
whether or not it results in a tax lower than would be 
paid if rules of strict logic and reason were applied 
to the situation. If the deductions here claimed fall 
within the letter and general intent of the statute, in-
19 I 
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terpreted in the light of statutes existing when it was 
adopted, then the trial Court properly exercised his 
discretion to allow them. 
It does not appear that the cases cited and relied 
upon by the AppeUant here were decided under statutory 
provisions of the kind in effect here in Utah, and for 
that reason they are quite inapplicable. 
Where, as here, rental as well as the corpus of the 
estate is liable for the payment. of the obligations of the 
estate, it is quite immaterial whether the deductions 
claimed have or could have been paid out of rental rather 
than out of the corpus. The deductions are proper in 
either event. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the facts and the law as hereinbefore out-
lined, it is respectfully submitted that the trial Court 
properly interpreted the law and properly exercised the 
discretion vested in him by the law to allow the deduet-
ions as expenses of administration, that even if they 
were not properly expenses of administration they are 
properly deductable as debts of the decedent existing 
at his death, and that in any event the order of the trial 
Court is proper and should be affirmed. 
L.._ ·--- .. - .......... ;;....._ ..... ~ .... , • 
Respectfully su hmi tted, 
PAUL THATCHER 
OF THATCHER & YOUNG, 
1018 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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